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Abstract
The recent sovereign debt crisis has renewed the interest in fiscal consolidation policies
and the associated output losses they entail. However, countries that adopted such policies
are also plagued by persistent unemployment, and debt reduction ought to magnify the
problem. This paper extends the standard neoclassical growth model to (i) the presence of
public debt and (ii) the search and matching frictions in the labor market and quantifies
the output and employment losses associated with fiscal consolidation episodes. The
main results indicate that these losses can be substantially high. For instance, a 25%
debt reduction yields a 50% increase in unemployment along the adjustment path. The
paper also shows that policymakers need to carefully consider the intertemporal trade–off
between short–run losses and long–run gains from the lower debt in their design of fiscal
consolidation plans. Its timing, its size, the choice of fiscal instruments used to achieve
it, and the role of monetary policy, also matter.
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1 Introduction
The recent sovereign debt crisis has brought back fiscal consolidation in the policy debate.
Between 2004 and 2012 the sovereign debt to GDP has increased around 35 percentage
points for France, Greece, and United States; and for countries like Portugal and United
Kingdom this increase has been around 60 percentage points (see Table (1)). Such high
levels of public debt are not without consequences for these economies in particular in terms
of growth (see Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)). Governments in most advanced economies have
acknowledged the problem and have been making efforts to design and implement fiscal
consolidation plans in an attempt to reduce public debt. These plans have been implemented
by either a reduction in government expenditure or by increasing the tax rates (either labor,
consumption, or capital tax rates).
Table 1: Sovereign debt (% of GDP)
France Greece Iceland Italy Portugal Spain UK US
2004 71.4 128.1 50.4 110.6 67.4 41.7 43.5 56.4
2012 103.8 164.3 117.5 131.1 126.2 67.6 103.2 93.8
Change 32.4 36.2 67.1 20.5 58.8 25.9 59.7 37.4
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators. Note: Changes in ratio are ex-
pressed in percentage point.
There exists a sizable literature that studies that effect of fiscal consolidation on the economy
(e.g. Perotti (1996), Alesina et al. (2014), among others). This literature has shown that
the effects of fiscal consolidation episodes on output vary a lot with the fiscal instrument
used to achieve the fiscal consolidation, the timing, the speed and the size of the consolida-
tion. The identification of the consolidation plan also plays a role. While the output loss
and the associated sacrifice ratio have been extensively analyzed, the effect of fiscal consol-
idation episodes on the employment remains largely unaddressed in the literature. This is
however interesting for at least two main reasons. First, most of the countries that undergo
a fiscal consolidation are countries that experience high and persistent unemployment rate
(e.g. Spain, Italy, France,. . . ), it is then critical to evaluate (i) the potential employment
loss (rise in unemployment) associated with the effort required to achieve the debt reduction
and (ii) the persistence of this loss. Second, countries in which employment is still at a low
level may also need to evaluate the potential output loss for monetary considerations. For
instance, the Federal reserve, on September, 17, 2014, the FOMC re-affirmed the existence of
an “FOMC’s objective of maximum sustainable employment”, which, in the context of fiscal
consolidation, makes it critical to evaluate employment losses for the conduct of monetary
policy. The objective of this paper is therefore to offer a minimal theoretical framework –a
dynamic general equilibrium model– that allows to evaluate the employment loss associated
with debt reduction plans.
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This paper is related to the literature that studies fiscal consolidation within DSGE models.
In particular, it relates to the seminal paper by Erceg and Linde´ (2012) which investigated
to what extent and how fiscal consolidation can harm output in a monetary union. In their
setting, given the constraints imposed by monetary union and the focus of the central bank
on area wide aggregate, monetary policy cannot accommodate the fiscal consolidation. In
this setting, they find that an expenditure-based consolidation depresses output by more than
a tax-based consolidation for several years. They also show that the “optimal strategy”—in
terms of minimization of sacrifice ratio— is to mix sharp–temporary tax raise with gradual
spending costs. The present paper builds upon their analysis, in particular in terms of
the design of the fiscal consolidation process. It however fundamentally departs from their
analysis in two important ways. First of all, I consider a real closed economy as my benchmark
setting. Closing the economy, I can focus the mechanisms at work within the economy that
prevail during the adjustment path toward the new level of debt. By considering a real
economy, I initially abstract from any interplay between monetary and fiscal policy, thereby
isolating the mere fiscal mechanisms. I however also consider, as a sensitivity analysis, a
nominal version of the model which enables to retrieve the interplay between the two types
of policies. A second important point of departure from their analysis lies in the fact that the
labor market of the economy considered in this paper features search and matching frictions.
The existence of frictions on the labor market permits to study employment dynamics and
to derive a measure of employment loss associated with fiscal consolidation episodes. In that
respect, this paper is also related to the paper by Pappa et al. (2014), who also analyzes the
effects of fiscal consolidation episodes within a DSGE model featuring labor market frictions.
However, their analysis focuses on the role of rent seeking and tax evasion during spending
cuts and tax hikes episodes more so than evaluating the role of labor market frictions. Doing
so their analysis is relevant for Southern countries in which these phenomena prevail.
The model builds on the textbook neoclassical growth model extended to (i) the presence
of public debt and (ii) the existence of search and matching frictions a` la Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) and Shimer and Rogerson (2010) on the labor market. The motivations
for these two basic assumptions are grounded in the question addressed in this paper: the
evaluation of employment (and output) loss generated by fiscal consolidation. There are
several ways of generating (un)employment fluctuations in a general equilibrium framework
(gift exchange, shirking, implicit contracts, search. . . ); in this paper, I follow Merz (1995),
Andolfatto (1996) Fe`ve and Langot (1996) by integrating this search and matching setup
in a general equilibrium model to explain the cyclical behavior in wages and employment
fluctuations. Within this framework, the matching of workers and firms is costly, which
results in a surplus for existing jobs and a bargaining situation over the wage. The model is
otherwise standard.
Following Erceg and Linde´ (2012), the government aims at reducing its debt to output ratio.
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It is reasonable to assume that policymakers would reduce the debt target gradually to help
avoid potentially large adverse consequences on output. The main experiment assumes an
initial 100% debt/GDP level which is then gradually reduced to 75%, which, thus, reflects
25% reduction in desired debt target –debt to output ratio. Its implementation is reached by
adjusting the fiscal revenue to keep both the debt to output and deficit close to its target path.
This is captured by a simple fiscal rule that fiscal authority abides by. The fiscal revenue
adjustments are administered through the distortionary time varying taxation. In the baseline
experiment, only the labor tax rate is allowed to adjust and government spendings are kept
constant over time. Given that the model does not consider stochastic shocks, the model
is solved under perfect foresight, and all potential non-linearities affecting the adjustment
dynamics are preserved. Later, the model is also extended to incorporate nominal rigidities.
Specifically, it integrates price stickiness and standard Taylor rule allowing for a potential
interaction between fiscal and monetary policies.
The fiscal austerity is accompanied by a recession in an attempt to achieve the debt reduction
objective. Thus, both employment and output decrease. At the trough of the recession (4.5
years following the beginning of the adjustment), output is 1.5% below its initial steady
state. In the benchmark experiment, the initial unemployment rate is 5.5% and it climbs
up to 7.3% after 3.35 years following the commencement of fiscal consolidation. Thus, at its
peak the employment loss reaches 1.9 percentage points in deviations from its steady state.
The employment losses are persistent and lasting on average 12 years.
The mechanism at work is as follows. A debt reduction requires that tax revenue increase
in order to finance the constant flow of government expenditures. This implies that tax
revenues have to increase in order to finance the constant flow of government expenditures.
The government substitutes debt for tax revenues, therefore creating a negative wealth effect
on the agents. As will become clear later, the presence of the negative wealth effect will lead
to a decrease in consumption and investment –and therefore capital accumulation– which will
affect negatively the tax base. Tax rates have to adjust. Given that both the consumption
tax, the capital income tax and lump sum taxes are held constant, the labor tax has to
increase to permit the increase in the tax revenues. The tax increases from 25% to about
30% at the peak. As the debt reduction process approaches completion, the effort in debt
reduction is compensated by a reduction in debt services. Tax revenues can then be lowered,
which translates eventually into a reduction in the labor tax that eventually reaches a lower
level of 23.8%.
Higher labor tax rate, then, leads to an increase in the wage. This reflects the fact that the
household uses the Nash bargaining process to be compensated for the increase in the tax
burden. The increase in the wage reduces the marginal value of employment for the firm,
which then cut on their vacancy postings. This therefore increases unemployment, and its
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duration. Hence the persistent drop in employment in the economy.
Over the whole adjustment (from period t to ∞), the cumulative employment losses amount
to 41.2% and for output it amounts to 53.6% (the discounted cumulative losses are 17%, given
the discount factor of household), meaning that the short–run losses outweigh the long run
gains. As the beneficial effects of fiscal consolidation kick in, the losses do recede. However,
it takes 58 years for the cumulative output losses to cancel out and eventually turn into gains,
45 years for employment. This points to the existence of an intertemporal trade off between
the long–run gains of debt reduction on the one hand, and the short–run employment and
output losses generated by fiscal consolidation. In a nutshell, the main results reveal that
fiscal consolidation episodes are costly in the short to medium run, both in terms of output
and in terms of employment. Thus, households have to be patient enough to experience the
gains associated to such policies.
To provide a better understanding of consolidation dynamics, the robustness of these find-
ings is then assessed to alternative settings for the consolidation policy. In particular, the
sensitivity to the state of the business cycle, the speed and size of the debt reduction, the
presence of alternative instruments (government spendings, and other taxes) and the timing
of the consolidation are investigated. The robustness analysis shows the losses tend to be
higher during recessions due to the opposing demands placed on the labor tax adjustment by
(i) fiscal consolidation and (ii) output stabilization. Faster debt consolidation comes at the
cost of a bigger initial adjustment which magnifies the employment loss in the short–run. A
slower adjustment allows for smooth debt adjustment that limits the initial employment loss,
but in that case it lasts longer and the economy, thus, suffers longer. Moreover, the paper
shows that endogenous government spending, the type of tax instrument used to achieve
fiscal adjustment, and expected future debt reduction also matter. Finally, the interplay
between fiscal and monetary policy is analyzed. The monetary policy is non neutral and it
affects the fiscal consolidation process. The central bank by adjusting the nominal interest
rate affects the value of debt used by households to transfer wealth from one period to the
next. Higher nominal interest rate increases the value of debt, which then reduces its demand
by households. This aids the whole debt reduction process and, thus, speeding up the fiscal
consolidation in the short–run.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark real model. Section 3
details the model calibration. Section 4 investigates the implications of fiscal consolidation
in terms of output and employment loss and shades light on the main mechanisms at work
in the model. Section 5 conducts a sensitivity analysis of our results to changes in the way
the fiscal consolidation is achieved. In particular, I investigate how the choice of the fiscal
instruments, the timing, the size of the debt reduction matter. I also study how sensitive are
the results to the state of the business cycle. Section 6 extends the model to the presence
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of nominal rigidities, thereby allowing to address the interplay between fiscal and monetary
policies. In this section the sensitivity analysis for a nominal economy is performed: it studies
the nominal aspect for an alternative fiscal instrument –consumption tax–, the degree of price
rigidity, and the responsiveness of central bank to output fluctuations and price stabilization.
A last section offers concluding remarks.
2 Model
This section presents a standard neoclassical model extended to (i) the presence of public
debt and (ii) the existence of search and matching frictions a` la Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) and Shimer and Rogerson (2010) on the labor market. The motivations for these
two basic assumptions are grounded in the question addressed in this paper: the evaluation
of employment (and output) loss generated by fiscal consolidation. Given that the fiscal
consolidation considered in this paper takes the form of a reduction in the sovereign debt to
output ratio, the model includes public debt. Given that we are interested on the effects on
(un)employment, the model shall feature a motive for the existence unemployment. There are
several ways of generating (un)employment fluctuations in a general equilibrium framework
(gift exchange, shirking, implicit contracts, search. . . ); In this paper, I follow Merz (1995),
Andolfatto (1996) Fe`ve and Langot (1996) who showed, in various frameworks, how search
and matching frictions provide with a fairly good representation of unemployment fluctuations
in the business cycle. The model is otherwise standard.
2.1 Labor Market Frictions
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we assume that trade on the labor market is
costly and subject to coordination failures that are captured by the existence of search and
matching frictions. There exists a continuum of mass 1 of individuals who, in each and every
period, can be either employed (a fraction nt) or unemployed (ut = 1 − nt). All individuals
are assumed to possess the same skills and abilities, implying that their status on the labor
market is not determined by their relative productivity, but by the outcome of a random
search process. Given this ex-post heterogeneity across individuals, and given that these
individuals will accumulate assets as a way to transfer wealth across periods, the wealth
distribution in the economy is potentially a state variable. In order to avoid dealing with
a distributions and face a typical Krusell and Smith’s (1998) problem, we assume that all
individuals are members of a single representative household and meet at the end of the
period and pool resources –therefore implementing a perfect risk sharing environment. This
way the only relevant state variable pertaining to wealth accumulation will be the level of
assets, and not their distribution.
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The existence of search and matching frictions on the labor market are captured by the
existence of a matching function that relates the number of successful matches, Mt, to the
number of unemployed, ut, and the number of vacancies, vt, posted by firms
Mt = m(ut, vt)
which is strictly increasing, concave in both ut and vt and exhibits constant returns to scale.
1
Following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008a), we use the following matching function
m(ut, vt) =
vt(1− nt)
(vξt + (1− nt)ξ)1/ξ
(1)
where the matching function parameter is ξ ∈ (0, 1). The evolution of aggregate employment
can then be described as follows. At the beginning of period t, nt individuals are employed.
During period t, Mt new matches are formed and add to the existing level of employment.
Finally a constant fraction ψ ∈ (0, 1) of individuals separate from their employer. Hence, the
level of employment available as of t+ 1 is given by
nt+1 = Mt + (1− ψ)nt (2)
Note that, because the matching function depends on aggregate quantities that are out of
control of the individuals, this equation captures all externalities at work in the search and
matching process.
Consider the case of a individual looking for a job. Using the law of large numbers, this
individual has a probability
st =
Mt
ut
=
m(ut, vt)
ut
of finding a job. This individual faces two types of externalities. First it benefits from a
positive trade externality created by firms: by posting more vacancies on the market, firms
increase the probability that an individual will find a job (∂st/∂vt > 0). Second, it suffers a
congestion externality: when more individuals are searching, the probability of finding a job
decreases (∂st/∂ut < 0). Given the existence of constant returns to scale, the probability of
finding a job rewrites
st = s(θt)
where θ = vt/ut is a measure of labor market tightness. It should also be clear from the
previous discussion that s′(·) > 0.
Likewise, consider a firm posting vt vacancies. Using the law of large numbers, the probability
of filling a vacancy is given by
qt =
Mt
vt
=
m(ut, vt)
vt
1This assumption of matching function exhibiting constant returns to scale is consistent with the empirical
findings reported by Blanchard and Diamond (1989) for US data and by Pissarides (1986) for UK data.
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Like the case of an individual, each firm faces two types of externalities. First it benefits
from a positive trade externality created by unemployed workers: The larger the pool of
workers the firm faces, the larger the probability it will fill a vacancy (∂qt/∂ut > 0). Second,
it also faces a congestion externality created by the other firms: may match with, by posting
more vacancies on the market, firms increase the probability that an individual will find a
job (∂st/∂vt > 0). Second, it suffers from a congestion externality: the larger the number of
vacancies the smaller the probability the firm will fill its vacancy (∂qt/∂vt < 0). Note that
this probability can also be expressed in terms of labor market tightness as qt = q(θt) where
q′(·) < 0. In that context the employment level of firm j, nt(j), evolves as
nt+1(j) = qtvt(j) + (1− ψ)nt(j) (3)
The fact that qt is beyond the control of the firm captures the existence of externalities.
2.2 Households
There exists a representative household who is composed of a continuum of individuals. At the
beginning of period t, the members of the household visit the labor market. As explained in
the previous section, a fraction nt of these members are employed. These individuals supply
inelastically 1 unit of labor. The complementary fraction is unemployed and performing
search activities. At the end of the period, all these members go back to the household and
pool their resources, therefore enabling perfect risk sharing. As explained in the previous
section, this assumption simplifies our analysis as it allows us to ignore any distributional
issue.2 The household has preferences over consumption and leisure described by the following
intertemporal utility function3
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log ct − ϑ n
1+ν
t
1 + ν
)
(4)
where ν > 0 and ϑ > 0. ct denotes the household’s consumption and nt is the fraction of
employed household members, which is determined by the matching process and is beyond
the control of the household.
The household enters a period with some initial financial wealth bt−1 that yields a gross real
return rt−1, earns a wage wt per unit of labor, pays a proportional labor tax τwt ∈ (0, 1), such
that the total after tax labor income is given by (1− τwt )wtnt. The household leases capital
2An alternative way of dealing with this issue would be to create a perfect unemployment insurance market.
At the beginning of the period, each household buys an insurance contract that insures her against labor market
risk. Assuming that insurance companies are risk neutral, this insurance mechanism is perfect in the sense
that be she employed or not the household would enjoy the same marginal utility of consumption. Therefore,
all household would accumulate the same and the distribution of asset would be irrelevant for the solution.
3Implicit in this formulation of the utility is that the household’s disutility of labor is determined by the
disutility of the aggregate labor supplied by her members rather that the aggregation of the disutilities. This
assumption is consistent with the fact that individuals pool resources within the household.
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at the after–tax rental rate (1−τkt )zt, where τkt ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital income tax. Each
member also receives a share of the profits of all firms, Πt, and a lump–sum government
transfer, Tt. This income is then used to consume, ct (net of consumption of tax τ
c
t ∈ (0, 1)),
invest, it, and purchase assets, bt, as a way to transfer wealth towards next period. She
therefore faces the following budget constraint
(1 + τ ct )ct + it + bt = rt−1bt−1 + (1− τwt )wtnt + (1− τkt )ztkt + Πt + Tt (5)
Investment, it leads to the formation of the capital stock, kt, whose law of motion is described
by
kt+1 =
(
1− φ
(
it
it−1
))
it + (1− δ)kt (6)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the rate of depreciation of capital. Implicit in this formulation is that
capital accumulation is subject to convex investment adjustment costs, φ(·), a` la Christiano
et al. (2005). These costs satisfy φ(1) = φ′(1) = 0, such that these costs are inoperative in
the steady state, and ϕ ≡ φ′′(1) > 0. 4
The household determines her consumption, investment and accumulation plans by maximiz-
ing her utility subject to her budget constraint (5), transition equation for capital (6), and
given the perceived law of motion of employment (2) (which remains beyond her control at
this stage of the problem). In doing so, a household takes as given prices, taxes and transfers,
and aggregate quantities.
The household’s optimal behavior is then characterized by the set of Euler conditions
1
ct(1 + τ ct )
= β
rt
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(7)
qit = β
ct(1 + τ
c
t )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(zt+1(1− τkt+1) + qit+1(1− δ)) (8)
1 = qit
(
1− φ
(
it
it−1
)
−
(
it
it−1
)
φ′
(
it
it−1
))
+ β
ct
ct+1
qit+1φ
′
(
it+1
it
)(
it+1
it
)2
(9)
where qit is the marginal Tobin’s Q associated with the capital decision. Equation (7) is
the standard consumption saving intertemporal arbitrage condition, which is just distorted
by the presence of the consumption tax. Equation (8) describes the standard consumption
investment tradeoff faced by the household. As in the case of the consumption savings
decision, this arbitrage condition is also affected by the tax. The last equation describes
the evolution of the marginal Tobin’s Q, qit, which differs from unity due to the presence of
investment adjustment costs. The presence of potentially time varying taxes in the optimal
decisions of the household highlights how fiscal consolidation will affect the economy.5 Fiscal
4Note that for the quantitative analysis, the costs will take the form
φ(x) =
ϕ
2
(x− 1)2
where ϕ ∈ R+ control for the size of the costs.
5As will become clear later, the wage faced by the household will also be affected by variations in a tax.
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consolidation, in the form of a reduction of the debt to output ratio, requires the government
to find alternative ways of financing its public expenditures. This will then require some
adjustment in the tax rates, which will in turn affect the optimal consumption, investment
and savings decisions of the household.
2.3 Firms
There exists a continuum of firms, indexed by j ∈ (0, 1), which produce a homogenous good
that can be either consumed or invested by means of capital and labor. The technology
exhibits constant returns to scale and can be described by the Cobb–Douglas production
function
yt(j) =Atk
α
t (j)nt(j)
1−α (10)
where α ∈ (0, 1). At denotes the total factor productivity of the firm, which sequence,
{At}∞t=0, is exogenously given. Note that given that firms all face the same technology
and that there does not exist any idiosyncratic uncertainty, firms will be identical ex-post.
Contrary to the standard neoclassical framework, the existence of labor market frictions
implies that firms that enter in period t with employment nt(i) have to post vacancies vt(j)
should it want to increase its level of employment to be used in the next period. However
posting a vacancy involves paying a constant unit cost a > 0. The firm has a probability
qt (beyond the control of the firm) of filling this vacancy, and faces a probability ψ that a
employee separates. The law of motion of employment in firm i is therefore described by
Equation 3. The firm decides its production and vacancy posting plans by maximizing its
intertemporal discounted profit subject to the law of motion of employment
max
∞∑
t=0
Ψ0,t (yt(j)− ztkt(j)− wtnt(j)− avt(j)) (11)
subject to Equation (3). Ψ0,t denotes the discount factor of the firm between periods 0 and t,
given that, in the model, the interests of the manager of the firm are aligned with those of the
shareholder –the household– the proper discount factor is given by Ψ0,t ∝ βt(1 + τ ct )∂U(ct,nt)∂ct .
The optimal production and vacancy posting plans are characterize by the following optimal-
ity conditions
zt = α
yt(j)
kt(j)
(12)
a
qt
= β
ct(1 + τ
c
t )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(
(1− α) yt+1(j)
nt+1(j)
− wt+1 + (1− ψ) a
qt+1
)
(13)
The first condition is the standard demand for capital. The second condition determines the
optimal vacancy posting behavior–and hence the optimal employment level. Firms j chooses
the number of vacancies such that the marginal advertising costs equalizes the expected
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discounted future payoff. The expected payoff is conditional on the marginal vacancy leading
to a match with probability qt. The left hand side of (13) captures effective marginal hiring
costs, which a firm trades off against the surplus over wage payments it can appropriate and
against the benefit of not having to hire someone next period. Note that, in a symmetric
equilibrium, it must be the case that xt(j) = xt(i) = xt, with x ∈ {k, n, v}.
2.4 Wage determination
The existence of labor frictions implies that there does not exist an auctioneer that would
set the wages competitively. A mechanism to determine the wage must be specified. In
this paper, I follow the literature (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Merz (1995),
Andolfatto (1996) among others) and assume that wages are determined as the outcome of a
bilateral bargaining process between workers and firms. Since the workforce is homogeneous
without any differences in skill, for instance, each worker is marginal when bargaining with
the firm. Both parties choose wage rates to maximize the joint surplus generated from their
employment relationship: surpluses accruing to the matched parties are then split according
to a Nash bargaining mechanism.
The surplus of a firm, ΩFt , is given by
ΩFt = (1− α)
yt
nt
− wt + (1− ψ) a
qt
and corresponds to the marginal value –expressed in terms of goods– of a match, which
corresponds to the marginal product of employment net of the wage paid to the new hired,
to which adds the marginal benefit of not having to hire a new worker in the next period.
The before tax surplus of the household, ΩHt , is given by the marginal utility value of a
match, expressed in terms of goods by dividing by the marginal utility of consumption. The
marginal utility value of a match can be found by comparing the options available to the
worker. When the worker is employed, she contributes to the household value by earning
a wage wt, but suffers a disutility from working and forfeits an outside option payment Xt.
This is weighted against next period’s expected utility. The marginal utility value of a match
is thus given by
ΩHt = wt −
Xt
1− τwt
− ϑctn
ν
t
1− τwt
+ β
(1 + τ ct+1)ct+1
(1 + τ ct )ct
1− τwt+1
1− τwt
ΩHt+1(1− ψ − qtθt)
where I made use of the expression for the marginal utility of consumption, and the derivative
of next period employment with respect to current employment.
The joint surplus, St, is then given by
St ≡ ΩHt
η
ΩFt
1−η
(14)
11
where η ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative bargaining power of workers. The wage is then set so
as to maximize the joint surplus, which leads to the surplus sharing
(1− η)ΩHt = ηΩFt
Substituting of the individual surpluses values results, after tedious algebra, in the following
wage setting:
wt =
η
(
(1− α) ytnt + aθt + (1− ψ) aqt
)
+ (1− η) ((1− τwt )Xt + ϑnνt ct(1 + τ ct ))
1− τwt (1− η)
(15)
As is typical in models with surplus sharing, the wage is a weighted average of the payments
accruing to workers and firms, with each party appropriating a fraction of the other’s surplus.
The bargained wage also includes mutual compensation for costs incurred, namely hiring costs
and the utility cost of working. The bargaining weight determines how close the wage is to
either the marginal product or to the outside option of the worker, the latter of which has two
components, unemployment benefits and the consumption utility of leisure. Note that the
wage setting rule is fundamentally affected by the labor tax rate. It can be readily verified
that as long as the worker’s outside option Xt is smaller than the wage –which would be
the case is the outside option is a fraction of the wage, like unemployment benefits– this
function is increasing in the tax. It is then clear that should fiscal consolidation lead to an
increase in the labor tax, as a way to substitute debt for tax revenues when financing public
expenditures, this would put upward pressure on the bargained wage rate and will, in turn,
reduce the labor demand and increase equilibrium unemployment. Likewise the consumption
tax ought to have a similar effect, should it be used to financed public expenditures.
2.5 Fiscal policy and Debt adjustment
Fiscal authorities collect taxes (ft) and issue public bonds (bt) as a way to finance an exoge-
nously given sequence of government spending {gt}∞t=0. Accordingly, the government budget
constraint is given by
bt = rt−1bt−1 + gt − ft (16)
Tax revenues, ft, comprise consumption tax revenues, τ
c
t ct, labor tax revenues, τ
w
t wtnt,
capital tax revenues, τkt ztkt and the lump–sum tax, Tt, such that
ft = τ
c
t ct + τ
w
t wtnt + τ
k
t ztkt + Tt (17)
Given this setting, I am now in a position to describe the fiscal consolidation process. Poli-
cymakers are assumed to use the proceeds from taxation to control the path of public debt.
More precisely, let us denote b?t the target debt to output ratio, then the fiscal authorities set
the tax revenues according to the simple rule
log(ft) = log(f) + γ1
(
log
(
bt−1
yt
)
− log(b?t )
)
(18)
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where γ1 > 0. This rule stipulates that any positive (negative) deviation of the debt/output
ratio from its targeted value leads to an increase (decrease) in tax revenues that the gov-
ernment should collect (γ1 > 0). That way the government substitute debt for tax revenues
(and vice versa). Let us then consider the case where, initially, public debt is on target
(bt−1/yt = b?t ), and assume that the targeted value of the debt/output ratio, b?t , is shifted
downward. As aforementioned, given that debt is predetermined, the debt/output gap in-
creases leading to an upward adjustment of tax revenues. Then, given that the government
spending are given, Equation 16 implies that the debt bt adjust downward. This adjustment
requires one or several tax rates to be adjusted. Which of the tax should be adjusted is
a priori indeterminate. In this paper, I adopt a purely positive approach to the problem.
Following Haavelmo’s rule, only one instrument will be used to achieve this increase in tax
revenues. In the sequel, as a benchmark experiment, the labor tax will be used to adjust tax
revenues, holding all other tax rates (and the lump sum tax) constant.6 Adjustment in the
consumption tax will also be considered in a separate experiment as a sensitivity analysis
exercise.
The adjustment in the debt/output ratio remains to be described. Following Erceg and Linde´
(2012), policymakers are assumed to reduce public debt gradually to avoid large adverse
consequences for output. This is implemented by assuming that the targeted debt/output
ratio, b?t , follows the exogenous process
b?t = ρbb
?
t−1 + (1− ρb)
(
log
(
b
y
)
+ εbt
)
(19)
where b/y denotes the initial steady state value of the debt/output ratio and {εbt}∞t=0 is an
exogenous sequence that will control for the fiscal consolidation. This process is akin to
a simple AR(1) process where the persistence is controlled by parameter ρb. For instance,
should εbt be a purely transient shock (e.g. {εbt}∞t=0 = {εb, 0, . . .}) with εb < 0, b?t would
drop on impact and converge back to log(b/y) monotonically. Fiscal consolidation in this
setting will then be implemented by considering the sequence {εbt}∞t=0 = {εb, εb, . . .}, with
εb < 0, implying that b?t will converge smoothly to log(b/y) + ε
b < log(b/y). The coefficient
ρb controls the speed of debt target adjustment such that high values of ρb lead to slower
adjustments.
2.6 General Equilibrium
A competitive general equilibrium is a sequence of prices Pt ≡ {rt+i, zt+i}∞i=0, a sequence of
wages Wt ≡ {wt+i}∞i=0, a sequence of taxes Tt ≡ {τwt+i, τ ct+i, τkt+i, Tt+i}∞i=0, a sequence of policy
6Note that things are a bit more subtle. In a general equilibrium, tax revenues will adjust for two reasons: (i)
adjustment in the tax instrument (the margin) and (ii) adjustment in the taxed revenue (general equilibrium
effect).
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instruments Gt ≡ {gt+i, ft+i, b?t+i}∞i=0 and a sequence of quantities Qt ≡ {ct+i, yt+i, kt+i, nt+i,
vt+i, bt+i}∞i=0 such that
1. for a given sequence of prices, Pt, a sequence of wages, Wt, a sequence of taxes, Tt
and a sequence of policy instruments, Gt, the sequence of quantities, Qt, solves the
optimization problems of the agents,
2. for a given sequence of prices, Pt, a sequence of taxes, Tt, a sequence of policy instru-
ments, Gt, and a sequence of quantities, Qt, the sequence of wages, Wt, is set according
to the wage bargaining process,
3. for a sequence of quantities, Qt, a sequence of wages, Wt, a sequence of taxes, Tt and
a sequence of policy instruments, Gt, the sequence of prices, Pt, clears the capital and
good markets,
4. for a sequence of quantities, Qt, a sequence of wages, Wt, a sequence of quantities, Qt
and a sequence of policy instruments, Gt, the sequence of taxes, Tt, implies that the
government budget constraint is satisfied.
3 Model calibration
The model does not admit an analytical solution and is therefore solved numerically, us-
ing Dynare. This requires the structural parameters to be assigned values. The model is
calibrated for the post-WWII US economy at the quarterly frequency. Table 2 reports the
parameter values.
The parameters pertaining to preferences and technology are standard and borrowed from
the Real Business Cycle literature. The psychological discount factor, β, is set such that the
rental rate of capital is about 4% (β = 0.99). The capital elasticity in the production function,
α is set to match the capital share of income in the National Income and Product Accounts
(α = 0.33).7. The capital depreciation rate, δm is set such that the annual depreciation rate
is equal 10 percent (δ = 0.025). The investment adjustment cost parameter, ϕ, is set to be
2, which lies in the range of values considered in the DSGE literature.
7Note that since the wage rate in this model economy does not correspond to the marginal product of
labor, 1− α is not equal to the labor share of total income. (1 − α) equals the sum of the labor share of
total income and the return to investing in job search. Contrary to the standard neoclassical growth model in
which labor’s share of income is constant, the model with labor frictions in the labor market exhibits a labor
share that varies over the business cycle, thereby mirroring this variable’s behavior in the data.
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Table 2: Model parametrization
Parameter Value Interpretation Target
β 0.990 discount rate 4% annual interest rate
α 0.330 capital input elasticity of output 33% capital share of income
δ 0.025 depreciation rate of capital 10% annual depreciation rate
G/Y 0.201
steady state government
spending in output ratio
Average government spending to
GDP ratio
τw 0.250 steady state labor income tax rate
Estimate of average effective labor income
tax rate by Mendoza et al. (1994)
τ c 0.060 steady state consumption tax rate
Estimate of average effective consumption
tax rate by Mendoza et al. (1994)
τk 0.430 steady state capital income tax rate
Estimate of average effective capital in-
come tax rate by Mendoza et al. (1994)
st 0.8094 probability of finding a job
qt 0.9469 probability of filling a vacancy
ψ 0.0648 separation rate
θ labor market tightness
v vacancy
a 0.07 vacancy posting cost
η 0.05 worker’s bargaining power
X outside option
n 0.945 steady state employment
ν 2 labor disutility parameter –
Annual debt is assumed to amount to 100% of GDP, which, on a quarterly basis, implies a
debt to output ratio of 4. This amount of debt is raised to financed government spendings
which represent 20% of GDP –the average government share over the post-WWII period in
the US. The steady state level of taxes is borrowed from Mendoza et al. (1994), who sets
τw, τ c and τk, equal to the average effective US tax rates for labor, consumption and capital
income: 0.25, 0.06 and 0.43 respectively. The parameters pertaining to the rules (18) and
(19) will be given when we describe the baseline experiment.
The parameters pertaining to the labor market are set following the approach outlined in
Shimer and Rogerson (2010) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008b).8 Their approach amounts
to set the parameters of the labor market to match, as closely as possible, the volatility of
market tightness in the data. This can be achieved as long as the model must also be able
to replicate the data along the other dimensions, namely the volatility of vacancies, the
volatility of unemployment, and the correlation between vacancies and unemployment. The
data indicate that the probability of finding a job (st) within the quarter is 0.8094, and
that to fill a vacancy, qt, is 0.9469. They also give the separation rate to be ψ = 0.0648.
Using the probability of finding a job, the separation rate and the law of motion of aggregate
8Note that Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008b) calibrated the model on a weekly basis, their approach is
modified to accommodate the quarterly frequency.
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employment in the steady state, the level of employment is
n =
s(θ)
ψ + s(θ)
= 0.945
implying an unemployment rate of 5.5%.
Given a value for the steady state employment, the other labor market variables are solved
using the remaining equations and the remaining parameters can be set. The elasticity in
the disutility of labor, ν, is set to 2, which lies well within the range of values used in the
literature.9 Following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008b) the total cost of posting a vacancy,
in terms of average quarterly labor productivity, is set to 4.67 percent. Given the labor’s
share of income averages to 0.66 in US data, this implies a quarterly vacancy posting cost, a,
of 0.07. Also, following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008b), the worker’s bargaining power, η
is set at 0.05. Using the wage setting equation, and the combination of low vacancy posting
costs, together with a bargaining power favoring firms, leads to a disutility parameter, ϑ of
0.349. Finally, the outside option is calibrated as Xt = labor replacement rate×wt(1−τwt ).10
4 Results
This section discusses our baseline experiment and presents our main results.
4.1 Transition Analysis
In this paper, fiscal consolidation takes the form of a permanent 25% decrease in the debt to
output ratio (εb = −0.25). However, this reduction in the size of debt is achieved smoothly.
More precisely, the persistence parameter of the debt target process (19), ρb, is set such that
half of this adjustment is performed within a business cycle –e.g. 6 years11 (ρb = 0.875).
12
In the fiscal rule the parameter governing the reaction of fiscal receipts to debt adjustments,
γ1 is set to 0.8, such that tax revenues are reactive to the initial jump in the target. Given
the importance of this parameter, variations in its value will be considered in Section 5.
Given that the model does not consider stochastic shocks, the model is solved under perfect
foresight using the relaxation method proposed by Boucekkine (1995), as implemented in
Dynare. This approach allows to preserve all potential non-linearities affecting the adjustment
dynamics. Finally, on the baseline experiment, only the labor tax rate is allowed to adjust
and government spendings are kept constant over time.
9Although this parameter does not correspond to the inverse Frisch elasticity, it is reminiscent of it. Esti-
mates for this elasticity range from 0.333 in representative macroeconomic studies to 100 for microeconomic
studies.
10The statistics on labor market replacement rate comes from Bureau of Labor Statistics and is set at 0.6.
11This value corresponds to the average duration of a complete business cycle from trough to trough (or
from peak to peak) for the post–war US economy, as reported by the NBER.
12In Section 5, other levels and speed of debt reduction will also be considered as a way to provide with a
better understanding of the consolidation dynamics.
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Figure 1: Fiscal Consolidation
0 50 100
75
80
85
90
95
100
Quarters
%
 o
f O
ut
pu
t
Debt/GDP
0 50 100
−5
0
5
10
15
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Tax revenues
0 50 100
22
24
26
28
30
Quarters
pe
rc
en
ts
Labor tax rate
The left panel of Figure 1 reports (i) the evolution of the debt target ratio, b?t , (dashed line)
alongside (ii) the evolution of the actual debt to GDP ratio in the economy (plain line). For
the sake of interpretation, the debt/output ratio is expressed in annualized terms. Initially,
the actual debt/output ratio is on target, 100% of GDP. As of the next period, the target
debt ratio starts adjusting toward its new long run level, 75%. Note the target debt ratio
adjusts much quicker to its new long–run value than the actual debt ratio. For instance, half
of the adjustment of the target has to be done within 6 quarters for the actual debt ratio to
achieve half of its adjustment in 6 years. This can be interpreted as the willingness of the
policymaker to anchor the expectations of the agents to the new target in a relatively short
time. This lag in the actual debt adjustment implies that the gap in the dynamics of actual
and target debt ratio is positive, immediately after the implementation of the policy, and
remains positive throughout the transition. This implies that tax revenues have to increase
in order to finance the constant flow of government expenditures (see middle panel of Figure
1). The government substitutes debt for tax revenues, therefore creating a negative wealth
effect on the agents. As will become clear later, the presence of the negative wealth effect
will lead to a decrease in consumption and investment –and therefore capital accumulation–
which will affect negatively the tax base. Tax rates have to adjust. Given that both the
consumption tax, the capital income tax and lump sum taxes are held constant, the labor
tax has to increase to permit the increase in the tax revenues (see right panel of Figure
1). The tax increases from 25% to about 30% at the peak. As the debt reduction process
approaches completion, the effort in debt reduction in compensated by a reduction in debt
services Tax revenues can then be lowered, which translates eventually into a reduction in
the labor tax that eventually reaches a lower level of 23.8%.
Figure 2 illustrates the effects of fiscal consolidation on output and employment, and reports
the percentage deviations of both variables from their initial steady state level. Output and
employment are left unaffected on impact as both employment and capital are predetermined
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in the model. As of the second period, both employment and output decrease. The govern-
ment therefore creates a recession in order to achieve its debt reduction objective. At the
trough of the recession (4.5 years following the beginning of the adjustment), output is 1.5%
below its initial steady state. The employment reaches its trough of 1.9 percentage points
in deviations from its steady state after 3.35 years. The negative effects on employment
and output are persistent. Employment reaches back its steady state after 12.9 years, and
Figure 2: Evolution of Output and Employment following 25% debt reduction
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only after this date the economy starts to benefit from its fiscal consolidation effort, and see
both its employment level and output be above the initial steady state. There clearly is an
intertemporal tradeoff the policymaker has to consider. Reduction of debt requires to plunge
the economy in a recession for a long period, before output increases and unemployment
recedes in the longer run.
As aforementioned, the fiscal consolidation process entails an increase in the labor tax rate.
The associated increase in the tax burden creates a negative wealth effect that, everything
else equal, reduces both consumption and investment (see Figure 3). This is the standard
effect, also present in the standard neoclassical model, that reduces the demand for goods
and triggers a recession. The increase in the labor tax has another effect on the economy that
is fundamentally related to the presence of labor frictions. From the wage setting equation
(15), we have
∂wt
∂τwt
=
(1− η)(wt −Xt)
1− τwt (1− η)
> 0⇐⇒ wt > Xt
Given that the outside option corresponds to a fraction of the wage in the model, an increase
in the labor tax leads to an increase in the wage. This reflects the fact that the household
uses the Nash bargaining process to be compensated for the increase in the tax burden. The
increase in the wage reduces the marginal value of employment for the firm, which then cut
on their vacancy postings (see middle of Panel (b) in Figure 3). Given that unemployment
is predetermined, the labor market conditions improve (θt decreases, see left of Panel (b) in
Figure 3). On the one hand this improves the situation of firms that then face a larger prob-
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Figure 3: Macroeconomic responses (Benchmark Experiment)
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ability of filling a vacancy, qt (positive trade externality). On the other hand, the situation of
the household deteriorates as she now faces a lower probability of finding a job, st (congestion
effect). This therefore increases unemployment, and its duration. Hence the persistent drop
in employment in the economy.
As already outlined in Section 3, the above described transitional dynamics are obtained
starting from a 5.5% unemployment rate. If, instead, higher unemployment rates are consid-
ered —as observed in southern European countries— the results are, if at all, barely affected.
In other words, these results are not affected by the initial steady state level of unemploy-
ment, and our analysis remains valid whether the economy is initially started from a high or
low unemployment rate.
4.2 Cumulative losses
This section offers a quantitative representation of the adjustment dynamics described in the
previous section. More precisely, cumulative losses of output an employment are computed.
The cumulative loss, `(y, k), of output (respectively employment, `(n, k)) at horizon k is given
by
`(y, k) = −100×
k∑
j=0
(
yt+j − yt
yt
)
such that `(y, k) is a positive number –expressed in percentages– that corresponds to the
cumulative losses the economy experience, in terms of output (resp. employment), between
period t and period t+ k. In the case of output, the discounted loss, `(y;β) is also computed
`(y;β) = −100×
∞∑
j=0
βj
(
yt+j − yt
yt
)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the psychological discount factor of the household.
Table (3) report the cumulative output and employment losses associated to the fiscal consol-
idation process at various horizons. Inspection of Table (3) reveals that fiscal consolidation
Table 3: Cumulative Losses
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.12 0.88 4.23 20.93 56.14 12.98 17.37
Employment 0.18 1.35 6.33 27.86 43.70 -8.88 –
episodes are costly in the short to medium run, both in terms of output and in terms of
employment. For instance, after one year, the economy would have experienced about 1%
output loss and would have, in total, lost 2.3 percentage points employment. Given the per-
sistence of the recession, these losses amplify over time, and after 5 years, the cumulative loss
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in terms of output is about 21%, 30% for employment. Losses recedes as the horizon increases
since the beneficial effects of fiscal consolidation kick in. It takes 58 years for the cumulative
output losses to cancel out and eventually turn into gains, 45 years for employment. This,
once again, points to the existence of an intertemporal trade off between the long–run gains of
debt reduction on the one hand, and the short–run employment and output losses generated
by fiscal consolidation. In the case of output, the discounted loss is still sizable, 17%, over
the whole adjustment (from period t to ∞), meaning that, given the discount factor of the
household, the short–run losses outweigh the long run gains.
5 Sensitivity analysis
The preceding results have shown that the output and employment costs of reducing public
debt can be sizable in the short to medium run, and that agents have to be patient enough
to experience the gains associated to such policies. This section assesses the robustness of
the previous findings to alternative settings for the consolidation policy. In particular, the
sensitivity to the state of the business cycle, the speed and size of the debt reduction, the
presence of alternative instruments (government spendings, and other taxes) and the timing
of the consolidation are investigated.
5.1 Recessions
The recent fiscal consolidation episode takes place in a particular economic environment:
most economies experience a recession. This section investigates the role of the state of
the business cycle for the impact of debt reducing policies on employment and output. To
this end, we compare the response of output and employment to the fiscal consolidation
policy described in the previous section when the economy is started from steady state to the
case where the economy is plunged into a recession initially. The recession is triggered by a
downward shift in total factor productivity At that brings output 2.5% below trend on impact.
Figure 4 reports the dynamics of output and employment during the fiscal consolidation
episode. The plain dark line corresponds to the benchmark experiment described in the
previous section, the red line corresponds to the deviation of output from its path in recession
during fiscal consolidation. The results indicate that reducing debt in a recession does not
generate significantly larger, although still marginally larger, output and employment losses
than when the economy is started from its steady state. The cumulative losses are marginally
larger in recession than in the benchmark experiment in the short-run, as witnessed by
Table 4. As time goes on, the losses increase a bit more during a recession. For instance,
fiscal consolidation yields a 30% cumulative employment loss when the fiscal consolidation is
started in a recession, 28% when started from steady state. The reason is that in recession
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Figure 4: Output and employment responses during recession
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Table 4: Cumulative losses due to fiscal consolidation
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.12 0.97 4.65 22.32 58.08 14.47 18.93
Employment 0.19 1.47 6.86 29.38 44.74 -8.20 –
fiscal policy is constrained as there is a direct trade off between the fiscal consolidation and
output stabilization in the recession. Thus, there are two opposing demands on the labor
tax adjustment; the fiscal consolidation demanding a hike in wage tax while the output
stabilization calling for a fall in wage tax. Consequently, the fiscal consolidation will be
slower in recession compared to the benchmark scenario, reflecting a direct trade off between
the fiscal consolidation and output stabilization.
5.2 Consumption taxes
In the benchmark experiment, the debt reduction was achieved by adjusting the labor tax
rate holding the other taxes —namely consumption and capital taxes— constant, at their
steady state levels. In this section, I investigate the effects of fiscal austerity as achieved
through adjustment of the consumption tax rate (for example, retail sales tax, a value-added
tax, and a consumption-type flat tax) instead.13
Figure 5 reports the adjustment dynamics of fiscal aggregates and the tax rate during the
fiscal consolidation. The consumption tax increases from 6% —its steady state level in the
initial regime— to about 10.3% at the peak (reached in 3.5 years following the beginning of
fiscal austerity) — a 4.3 percentage points increase which is of the same order as the increase
in the labor tax. As the debt reduction process approaches completion, the effort in debt
13Such a consumption tax adjustment was recently put forward in France as a way to obtain a social V.A.T.
(see Fe`ve et al. (2010)).
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reduction in compensated by a reduction in debt services. Tax revenues can then be lowered,
which translates eventually into a reduction in the consumption tax that eventually reaches
a lower level of 4.75%.
Figure 5: Fiscal Consolidation: Consumption Tax (I)
0 50 100
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
Quarters
%
 
debt/GDP
0 50 100
−5
0
5
10
15
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Tax revenue
0 50 100
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Quarters
%
Tax rate
labor tax consumption tax
The initial increase in the consumption tax makes consumption relatively more expensive. As
a way to smooth their consumption over time, the households extract a greater surplus during
the wage bargaining process which puts upward pressure on the real wage (see equation 15
which is an increasing function of the consumption tax). The real wage increases, but the
marginal value of a new employee for the firm decreases which leads to a fall in vacancies.
However, this effect is not as direct as the increase in the labor tax and leads to a lower
adjustment of the wage and vacancy posting which drop less than in the labor tax case.
Hence, the permanent income of the agents is not as affected and consumption decreases less
than in the benchmark case, even though the adjusting tax is the consumption tax. Likewise
the adjustment of investment is dampened. Employment reaches back its steady state after
12.9 years, and only after this date the economy starts to benefit from its fiscal consolidation
effort, and see both its employment level and output be above the initial steady state. Just
as in our benchmark case, the policy maker faces an intertemporal tradeoff: plunging the
economy in a recession for a long period, before output increases and unemployment recedes
in the longer run.
Inspection of Figure 7 reveals, that compared to the labor tax rate, the use of consumption
tax generates (i) lower output loss –it stands at 1.01% deviations from its initial steady state
compared to it is 1.5% for labor tax (reached in 4.5 years following the commencement of
fiscal austerity), (ii) lower employment loss of 1.28% after 3.5 years – for labor tax rate this
is 1.9% deviations from its steady state after 3.35 years. The negative effects on employment
and output are persistent.
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Figure 6: Macroeconomic responses (Consumption Tax Experiment)
(a) Good Market
0 5 10 15 20
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Consumption
0 5 10 15 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Investment
(b) Labor Market
0 50 100
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Wage
0 50 100
−10
−5
0
5
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Vacancies
0 50 100
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
Quarters
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n
Labor Market Tightness
labor tax consumption tax
24
Figure 7: Evolution of Output and Employment (II)
0 5 10 15 20
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Output
0 5 10 15 20
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Employment
labor tax consumption tax
This is confirmed by inspection of Table (5) which reveals that, when government adjusts
the consumption tax rate, fiscal consolidation episodes are less costly in the short to medium
run, both in terms of output and in terms of employment. For instance, after two years, the
economy would have experienced about 3% output loss and would have, in total, lost 4.5
percentage points employment–when using the labor tax the output loss is around 4% and
employment loss is about 6%. Given the persistence of the recession, these losses amplify
over time. In the long run, after 50 years, the economy experiences cumulative gain of
9.2% for employment – in labor tax case these are lower and stand at 8.9%. Losses recedes
as the horizon increases since the beneficial effects of fiscal consolidation kick in. Under the
consumption tax adjustments, it takes one year less for the cumulative output losses to cancel
out and eventually turn into gains, 57 years versus 58 years under the labor tax adjustments.
In the case of output, the discounted loss is still sizable, 10.2%, over the whole adjustment
(from period t to ∞), but much lower than for labor tax, 17%. On the other hand, for both
tax regimes, it takes the same length of time for the cumulative employment losses to cancel
out – that is 45 years.
Table 5: Cumulative losses: Consumption Tax Adjustment
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.09 0.64 2.98 14.36 37.97 6.08 10.17
Employment 0.14 0.98 4.45 19.11 29.25 -9.15 –
For the consumption tax adjustments, the intertemporal trade off between the long–run gains
of debt reduction on the one hand, and the short–run employment and output losses generated
by fiscal consolidation, is still present, however these tend to be smaller compared to the labor
tax adjustments. These results indicate that, in terms of employment and output losses, the
consumption tax is better suited for fiscal austerity.
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5.3 Speed versus Amplitude
The fiscal consolidation is characterized by (i) the persistence and (ii) the amplitude of the
debt adjustment. In particular, as already explained above, the higher the persistence, the
smaller the amplitude effect, and vice versa. Intuitively, either by becoming more “aggressive”
or by speeding up the reduction of public debt has the advantage of reducing the time period
during which the economy experiences output and employment losses. However, a larger effort
may be required in the beginning of the fiscal consolidation given that the same adjustment
has to be performed in a shorter time. To strike the right balance between the two effects
and, thus, to face the most intertemporal tradeoff in terms of potency of the reform, the
government can achieve it by varying (i) the speed of debt adjustment, ρb, and (ii) its own
“aggressiveness” towards the debt adjustment, γ1.
As a way to investigate this issue, Panels (a) of Figure 8–9 report the transition dynamics
of fiscal instruments, output and employment as the speed of the debt adjustment is varied,
with a half–life ranging from 4 to 27 years. This adjustment is controlled by changing ρb in
the range 0.6 to 0.99 –the benchmark case setting being ρb = 0.875. Panels (b) of Figure (12)
illustrate the transitional paths when the initial amplitude of the debt adjustment. This is
achieved by controlling the degree of “aggressiveness” of fiscal authority to debt reduction,
γ1, which is varied from 0.2 to 0.99 – with the benchmark case set at 0.8.
The main implications of varying the speed of the adjustment can be obtained from Figure
8. Faster fiscal consolidation (lower ρb) requires that larger tax revenues be raised upfront
(see middle panel of Panel (a) of Figure 8), leads to a larger and shorter increase of the
labor tax rate (see right panel of Figure 8). For instance, the peak in the evolution of the
labor tax rate in our experiment occurs 3.5 years after the beginning of the consolidation and
amounts to a tax rate of 29.2% (25% in the initial steady state). When the half life of the
debt ratio adjustment is shortened to 4.2 years (ρb = 0.6), this peak is reached after 1.5 year
for a labor tax of 31%. Very similar results obtain when, instead, the government increases
the amplitude of the initial debt reduction, This is achieved by increasing its own attitude
to debt reduction, γ1. In the benchmark experiment, γ1 = 0.8, the labor tax rate amounts
to 29.14% of income at the peak of the tax rate adjustment, which occurs 3.75 years after
the commencement of fiscal consolidation. When the government adopts more aggressive
approach to debt reduction, γ1 = 0.99, this peak is reached in 3.25 years in the labor tax of
29.92%. In that context, the household needs to be given extra compensation in the wage
bargaining process, the wage increases more relative to the benchmark experiment. Firms
post relatively less vacancies and the employment loss is larger (see right panel of Figure 9).
Likewise, and for similar reasons, the output loss is also larger.
Most of the adjustment being accomplished over a shorter period of time, the increase in tax
is shorter. Accordingly the employment loss is less persistent. These results are reflected in
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Figure 8: Varying the Speed and “Aggressiveness” of Debt Adjustment (I)
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(b) Varying the Fiscal Authority “Aggressiveness”
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Figure 9: Varying the Speed and “Aggressiveness” of Debt Adjustment (II)
(a) Varying the Speed of Debt Adjustment
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Table 8 which reports the cumulative output and employment losses associated with these
experiments. The table clearly indicates that faster debt reduction is associated with larger
losses in the short run (1.54 percentage point for the case ρb = 0.6 versus 0.18 percentage
point in the benchmark), but these employment losses tend to recede quicker. For instance,
the cumulative employment loss canceled out after 45 years in the benchmark experiment, 43
years in the fast adjustment case. Interestingly, while the tax adjustment is much quicker in
the ρb = 0.6 case compared to the benchmark, this decrease in persistence does not transmit
to employment, nor to output. The reason for this is found in the matching process which
generates a lot of persistence in the model.
As the speed of debt adjustment is reduced –say ρb = 0.99– the reverse mechanisms are at
play. However, interestingly, a slower fiscal consolidation is accompanied by an increase in
debt in the short run. This is made possible by the fact that the government can spread the
debt adjustment over a long period, and that way achieve some form of tax smoothing. The
tax raises by much less in the transition (0.26 at the peak), and can even be lowered in the
short run. This initial fall in the tax rate puts downward pressure on the wage, which in turn
leads the firms to post more vacancies and hire more employees. Hence, in the short run,
employment losses turn into employment gains, and fiscal consolidation actually generates
mild employment and output gains. These gains are however short lasting and turn into
employment losses after 7 years and persist longer 56 additional years.
Table 6: Cumulative losses: Varying Speed
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
ρb = 0.600 1.04 4.21 11.98 32.53 58.18 12.53 20.45
ρb = 0.750 0.55 2.62 8.98 29.65 58.53 13.52 20.30
ρb = 0.875 0.12 0.88 4.23 20.93 56.14 12.98 17.37
ρb = 0.990 -0.24 -0.70 -1.47 -2.33 13.07 18.93 1.30
Employment
ρb = 0.500 1.54 6.15 16.81 39.27 40.66 -12.68 –
ρb = 0.750 0.82 3.87 12.81 36.82 42.08 -11.09 –
ρb = 0.875 0.18 1.35 6.33 27.86 43.70 -8.88 –
ρb = 0.990 -0.35 -1.02 -1.98 -1.95 18.36 15.13 –
Similar findings hold if the government instead decides to control its assertiveness to fiscal
consolidation, γ1. As it is evident from the results presented in Table 7, the more assertive
government is about its fiscal consolidation plan, the larger are losses in the short-run (for
γ1 = 0.2 we have employment gains of 0.27% while for the benchmark case, γ1 = 0.8, these are
translated into employment losses of 0.18%). But these employment losses tend to disappear
quicker. For lower government assertiveness, γ1 = 0.2, it takes 36.5 years for the cumulative
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employment losses to be canceled out compared to the benchmark experiment where it takes
only 17.25 years.
Table 7: Cumulative losses: Varying Fiscal “Aggressiveness”
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
γ1 = 0.2 -0.18 -0.47 -0.67 0.63 14.40 15.64 2.56
γ1 = 0.5 -0.04 0.19 1.72 11.28 45.57 13.18 11.44
γ1 = 0.8 0.12 0.88 4.23 20.93 56.14 12.98 17.37
γ1 = 0.99 0.22 1.34 5.83 26.17 59.36 13.83 20.06
Employment
γ1 = 0.2 -0.27 -0.67 -0.83 1.69 16.46 11.34 –
γ1 = 0.5 -0.05 0.32 2.73 15.99 40.61 -3.58 –
γ1 = 0.8 0.18 1.35 6.33 27.86 43.70 -8.88 –
γ1 = 0.99 0.33 2.02 8.56 33.95 43.63 -10.21 –
These transitional paths suggests that steady but gradual consolidation may be the strategy
that has the lowest cost in terms of lost output and employment. Cutting too much debt
today could throw economy into a deep recession. Cutting it slowly creates a much milder
recession, but a more persistent one. This is reminiscent of the gradualist versus “cold turkey”
approaches described by Sargent (1983). On one hand, a gradualist approach yields smaller
losses with longer persistence. On the other hand, “cold turkey” approach is associated
with larger losses in the short–run but with shorter duration. Thus, the policymakers face a
choice of two different approaches when deciding the policy which is best suited for its fiscal
consolidation plan, each with its own tradeoffs.
5.4 The size of debt adjustment
Naturally, the intertemporal tradeoffs that describe the fiscal consolidation –short–run em-
ployment (output) losses versus long–run gains– would be also present when the size of debt
adjustment is varied.
Understandably, the sizable reduction in the public debt requires more effort by the fiscal au-
thority and is more costlier in terms of employment (output) losses, but likewise, the long–run
gains are also larger. However, one question remains open: do proportional debt adjustments
generate proportional or disproportional losses? Figures 10–11 explore the (dis)proportional
effect of fiscal consolidation by a way of reporting the transitional paths of fiscal instruments,
employment and output as the size of debt adjustment, b?t , is varied in the range of 20% to
30% – the benchmark case involves 25% debt adjustment. As expected, larger fiscal consol-
idations require larger adjustment in the tax revenues and the labor tax rate. For instance
moving from a 20 to a 30% fiscal consolidation implies that the tax rate varies from 28 to 30%
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at the peak of its adjustment dynamics. Interestingly, the peaks reached in each experiment
are concomitant. However, given that the size of the tax rate adjustment vary with the size of
the debt reduction, the dynamics of debt are different. For instance, a 20% reduction having a
half life of 8 years, while a 30% consolidation having a half life of 5 years. In other words, the
dynamics are sensitive to the size of the debt reduction. To investigate the (dis)proportional
Figure 10: Varying the Size of Debt Adjustment (I)
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effects of the size in debt adjustment we plot in Panel (a) of Figure (11) the employment and
output losses corresponding to 20, 25 and 30% fiscal consolidation. A government wanting
to implement 20% debt reduction experiences the employment loss of 1.44% and output loss
of 1.1%, at the peak of its responses in 3.5 years. The government desires to implement our
benchmark debt reduction of 25% would then have to bear an additional employment loss
of 0.45% (and an additional output loss of 0.34%). But yet an extra 5% increase in desired
debt reduction would amount to an additional 0.49% in employment losses (and an addi-
tional 0.38% for output losses). So as expected from previous results, the size of employment
(output) losses is positively related to the amplitude of the fiscal consolidation. Panel (b)
of the figure reports the ratio of employment (output) losses corresponding to 20% and 25%
debt reduction, and 25% and 30% debt reduction. This figure clearly shows that employment
losses increase proportionally with the level of the debt reduction. Fiscal consolidation does
not involve strong nonlinear effects.14
These results are also reflected in Table (8) which reports the cumulative output and employ-
ment losses associated with these experiments. The table clearly points to the existence of
larger employment and output losses as we increase the desired debt reduction from 20% to
25% and then to 30%. In the short-run increasing debt reduction from 20% to 25% translates
into 0.03% larger employment losses, but increasing a desired debt reduction for another 5%
14A bit of qualification is in order. Employment and output losses are linearly related with the size of the
fiscal consolidation. In that sense the process does not display any nonlinearities. However, while the dynamics
of employment and output losses are proportional, those of debt are not. The differential adjustment of debt
(and hence some form of nonlinearities)actually insures the linearity in losses.
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Figure 11: Varying the Size of Debt Adjustment (II)
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(b) Output and Employment Ratios
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amounts to an additional 0.04% employment losses –the net difference of 0.01%. These tiny
differences are explained by the way tax rate affects the wage in a nonlinear fashion.
Table 8: Cumulative losses: Varying Size
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
20% 0.10 0.70 3.28 15.99 43.92 9.72 13.02
25% 0.12 0.88 4.23 20.93 56.14 12.98 17.37
30% 0.14 1.08 5.25 26.34 68.86 16.71 22.25
Employment
20% 0.15 1.07 4.91 21.35 34.60 -7.36 –
25% 0.18 1.35 6.33 27.86 43.70 -8.88 –
30% 0.22 1.65 7.84 34.94 52.95 -10.15 –
5.5 Endogenous government spending rule
So far, government spendings have been held constant over time, gt = g ∀ t = 0, . . . ,∞.15
As our previous results indicated, fiscal consolidation plunges the economy into a recession.
The government may then use government spending as an “automatic stabilizer” (Blanchard
(1984)) to dampen the adverse effects of debt reduction. A new tradeoff then emerges: fiscal
consolidation versus output stabilization. The government may use government spendings to
fight the recession, but by doing so it hinders the fiscal consolidation process. To investigate
this tradeoff, this section considers the case where government expenditures follow a simple
rule
log(gt) = ρg log(gt−1) + (1− ρg) log(g¯) + rg log
(
y
y¯
)
(20)
where ρg ∈ (0, 1) and rg < 0. The form of this rule stipulates that, in an attempt to influence
the dynamics of output, the government raises public expenditures whenever output falls
below its steady state level. Hereafter, I set ρg = 0.5 and rg = −0.5.
Figures 12–13 compare the transitional paths of fiscal instruments, output and employment
with exogenous government spendings (dashed line) —the benchmark experiment described
in the previous sections— and those obtained when the government uses an active policy
rule (plain line). As explained previously, the fiscal consolidation process triggers a recession.
A government that has a concern for output stabilization then sees output falling below its
steady state level and, according to rule (20), expands its expenditures. The financing of this
policy cannot be achieved by issuing government bonds —this would obviously go against
the fiscal consolidation— and calls for an increase in taxes. For instance, at the peak of
15The government spending is set at its steady state value of g = 0.2y.
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Figure 12: Varying Government Spending Rule (I)
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its adjustment path, the labor tax rate reaches 31.5% compared to the 29% with constant
government spending. This has two main consequences. First, the larger tax income col-
lection accelerates the debt reduction process Second, and more importantly, higher taxes
magnify employment (output) losses. For instance, under constant government spendings,
the maximal employment (resp. output) loss was 1.8 percentage points (resp. 1.3%), under
the active policy the maximal employment (resp. output) loss is 2.9 percentage points (resp.
2.2%)— a 60% increase. In other words, by pursuing the active loss, the government actu-
ally exaggerates the recession. Note however, that again the persistence/magnitude tradeoff
occurs, as while the recession is deeper it lasts longer, as the debt reduction is faster.
Figure 13: Varying Government Spending Rule (II)
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These findings are also confirmed by results in Table (9) which reports the cumulative output
and employment losses for this experiment. It is evident that in the short-run employment
(and output) losses are more than twice as large than when the government spending follows
exogenous process. For example, the employment losses are 0.68% compared to 0.18% in the
baseline experiment (the output losses are 0.12% relative to 0.45% in the baseline case).
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Table 9: Cumulative losses: Endogenous Government Responses
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.45 2.29 8.81 34.57 69.43 26.51 30.70
Employment 0.68 3.42 12.78 43.55 46.85 -5.22 –
The results imply that the government pushes the economy into a deeper recession as it tries
to pursue two conflicting goals: (i) debt reduction and (ii) output stabilization. Thus, the
government needs to consider carefully the tradeoff between the two goals and its use of
“automatic stabilizers”.
5.6 Announced Fiscal Consolidations
The preceding sections considered scenarios where the government started the fiscal consolida-
tion plan as soon as it announces it. This section investigates the case where the government
announces in period t that it will implement a debt reduction policy starting in t + 4.16 In
such a situation, agents expectations play a key role and may affect the adjustment path.
From a technical point of view, announcement amounts to introduce a shock that is revealed
to the agents 4 periods in advance in the debt target law of motion as
b?t = ρbb
?
t−1 + (1− ρb)
(
log
(
b
y
)
+ εbt−4
)
(21)
where, as previously, b/y denotes the initial steady state value of the debt/output ratio and
{εbt+4}∞t=0 is an exogenous sequence that will control for the fiscal consolidation. ρb controls
for the speed of fiscal consolidation adjustment.
At the time the government makes the announcement, and for the next 4 periods, the target
debt ratio remains unchanged —100% of GDP– and only starts adjusting in t + 4. The
adjustment dynamics that follow can then be better understood by splitting the adjustment
into two sub–periods. The first one starts at the time of the announcement and ends with the
implementation of the fiscal consolidation, and captures the mere effect of the announcement.
During this period only announcement effects are at play. The second one starts with the
effective implementation of the fiscal consolidation.
During the first sub–period, agents, who have perfect foresight, correctly expect that, as of
period t+4, the target debt ratio will start converging to its new long-run level, 75%. Agents
then expect higher future tax rates (see middle and right panels of Figure 14 and therefore that
they will suffer a negative wealth effect in the future. The consumption smoothing behavior
of the household makes her (i) cut on her consumption at the time of the announcement, and
16Note that full commitment and time consistency of the announcement will be assumed throughout. De-
parture from these assumptions is left for future research.
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(ii) start accumulating more wealth, as a way to cushion themselves from higher taxes. In the
current model, the agent has two ways to accumulate wealth: capital and bonds. Investment
increases in the short-run as a way to accumulate capital. But, more interestingly for the
purpose of this paper, the household also purchases government bonds. As shown in the left
panel of Figure 14 public debt actually increases during that period. This leads to actual
debt building up, which relaxes the government budget constraint. This explains why, in
the few periods that follow the announcement, tax revenues and the labor tax rate fall (see
middle and right panels of Figure 14). In other words, the announcement of the plan allows
the government to substitutes tax revenue for debt, therefore mitigating the negative wealth
effect on the agents. As already explained, the fall in the labor tax rate leads to a decrease
Figure 14: Expected Future Debt Adjustment (I)
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in the wage which increases the marginal value of employment for the firm, which then posts
more vacancies. On the one hand, firms prospect of filling a vacancy falls as they face more
competition from other firms in the labor market and as the probability of filling vacancy,
qt falls (congestion externality). On the other hand, the households find it, at first, easier
to find the job as the probability of finding a job, st increases (positive trade externality).
This, therefore, initially increases employment. The peak employment gain is reached in
third quarter and amounts to 0.46%. In other words, the mere announcement of the fiscal
consolidation ameliorates the labor market conditions in the very short-run.
After 4 periods, the actual debt reduction commences and the adjustment dynamics enter in
the second sub-period, during which the mechanisms at work are identical to those detailed
in Section 4. The results indicate that the whole dynamics is essentially postponed by 4
quarters. For example, the peak in the evolution of the labor tax rate occurs 4 years after
the fiscal consolidation commences, and 4 quarters later than in the baseline experiment, and
amounts to 29.2% (exactly the same as in the baseline experiment). Employment reaches
the trough after 4 years (once again 4 quarters later than in the baseline experiment) but are
slightly higher than in the baseline experiment and amount to 1.95% in deviations from the
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steady state (compared to just 1.9% in the baseline experiment). The output losses are also
slightly higher than in the baseline case and amount to 1.49% (1.48% in baseline case).
Figure 15: Expected Future Debt Adjustment (II)
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Given the preceding discussion, it comes as no surprise that the government’s announcement
of its future fiscal consolidation plans is accompanied, in the short-run, by a boost translated
into employment (and output) gains. For instance, there is employment cumulative gain of
1.43% (and output cumulative gain of 1.02%) recorded (see Table 10). These initial gains
will be translated into lower overall cumulative losses than under the baseline scenario. For
example, the discounted cumulative losses of output are 15.6%, which amounts to 1.8%
reduction relative to baseline case. This reduction is due to the prevailing negative wealth
effect in the first sub-period that creates an economic boom which is then translated into the
employment (and output) gains in the short-run and relatively lower losses in the future.
Table 10: Cumulative losses: Future Anticipated Debt Reduction
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output -0.33 -1.02 -0.51 13.41 55.12 13.68 15.63
Employment -0.48 -1.43 -0.18 20.31 45.97 -6.08 –
These transitional paths suggest that announcements about future fiscal consolidation might
be a policy that generates lower cost in terms of employment (and output) losses. This is
obviously conditional on the maintained assumption that the government fully commits to
implement the plan.
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6 Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The preceding sections have investigated the adjustment dynamics to a fiscal consolidation
episode in a real economy. The emphasis was put on the real aspects of such events, ignoring
the potential nominal dimension of public debt reduction. However, the interplay between
fiscal and monetary policy ought to have important consequences for the macroeconomy as
monetary policy —by affecting the nominal interest— may hinder or ease fiscal consolidation.
This section investigates this issue.
For monetary policy to matter, the model is amended in three ways. First, two types of
firms are introduced in the economy. Final goods retailers sell a homogeneous good, which
is an aggregate bundle of a set of intermediate goods that are produced by intermediate
goods producers. Because each and every good is fully differentiated and is purchased by
the final good producer, the intermediate goods producers have monopoly power. They are
therefore price setter. Second, these price setters face nominal rigidities in the form of price
adjustment costs.17 Finally, the central bank pursues an active monetary policy. Before going
to the results, we describe how the model was changed to introduced the non neutral nominal
dimension in the model.
6.1 Towards a Nominal Model
6.1.1 Final Goods-Producing Firm
There exists a representative final good producers that bundles a continuum of intermediate
goods yt(j), j ∈ (0, 1), each purchased at price Pt(j) on a competitive market. This final
retailer produces the homogenous good yt that can be either consumed or invested using the
technology
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
) ε
ε−1
(22)
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The demand for
each good j, as obtained by profit maximization, is then given by
yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε
yt (23)
where Pt is the aggregate price level. Competition in the market for the final good drives
the representative firm’s profit to zero. The zero-profit condition, along with Equation (23),
determines Pt as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−εdj
)1/(1−ε)
(24)
17Our results would be the same should a Calvo price setting mechanism be considered instead.
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6.1.2 Intermediate Good Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers that each produce a specific intermedi-
ate good j ∈ (0, 1) by means of capital and labor according to the constant return technology
described in Equation (10). Given the imperfect substitutability between intermediate goods,
each good j ∈ (0, 1) is demanded in positive quantity and each firm has local monopoly power.
Thus, the intermediate good producers sets the price Pt(j) for its output. However, changing
prices entails a convex cost (in terms of the final good)18 a` la Rotemberg (1982), which takes
the form
φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt (25)
where φ ∈ R+ controls for the size of these costs, and is a measure of the degree of price
stickiness. In particular, φ = 0 corresponds to the flexible price economy, φ = +∞ implies
the existence of constant prices. Given that the steady state inflation level is zero (pi = 1), it
is clear from Equation (25) that the cost is nil in the long-run. Firm j set its price so as to
maximize its intertemporal profits
max
∞∑
t=0
Φt,t+1
(Pt(j)
Pt
yt(j)−Ψt(j)yt(j)− φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
yt
)
(26)
subject to the demand it faces (Equation 23). Φt,t+1 is the appropriate discount factor of
the firm defined in Section 2.3, Ψt(j) is the real marginal cost of the firm. In a symmetric
equilibrium, The price setting equation gives rise to a standard Phillips curve
(1− ε)yt + εΨtyt − pitφ (pit − 1) yt + β 1 + τ
c
t
1 + τ ct+1
ct
ct+1
φpit+1 (pit+1 − 1) yt+1 = 0 (27)
where pit = Pt/Pt−1. The real marginal cost is given by the gap between the rental rate of
capital and the marginal product of capital
zt = Ψtα
yt(j)
kt(j)
(28)
Finally, the monopoly power of each firm affect its vacancy posting policy as
a
qt
= β
ct(1 + τ
c
t )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(
Ψt+1(1− α) yt+1(j)
nt+1(j)
− wt+1 + (1− ψ) a
qt+1
)
(29)
6.1.3 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy by adjusting short-term nominal interest
rate Rt in response to deviations of inflation pit from its steady–state value and changes in
18This implies that the resource constraint of the economy must be changed to
yt = ct + it + avt +
φ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2
yt
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the output gap. The monetary policy is assumed to be described by the simple Taylor-type
interest rate rule
Rt = ρrRt−1 + (1− ρr)
(
R+ κy log
(
yt
y
)
+ κpi log
(pit
pi
))
(30)
where ρr ∈ [0, 1], κy ∈ R+ and κpi > 1.
6.2 Results
In this section, we discuss the adjustment dynamics to a fiscal consolidation episode in a
nominal economy. However, before preceding to the results, we outline first the relevant
parametrization that remains outstanding. In particular, the elasticity of substitution be-
tween differentiated goods, ε, is set at 6 implying a steady state markup rate of 20%. The
price adjustment cost parameter, φ, is set to 58.19 Given its importance, we will conduct
later the sensitivity analysis around its value. In a monetary rule, the parameter governing
the reaction of the interest rate to output, κy, is set to 0.1, and the response to inflation, κpi,
is set to 1.5. The persistence parameter in the monetary policy rule, ρr, is fixed at 0.8.
The Figure 16–17 compare the transitional paths of fiscal instruments, output and employ-
ment for a flexible price (dashed line)–the benchmark experiment described in the previous
section– and sticky price (solid line) setups. As already explained, the commencement of
fiscal consolidation brings about a negative wealth effect, which plunges the economy in a
recession. The concern for output stabilization instructs the central bank to lower the inter-
est rate, which pushes both consumption and investment upward and therefore creates some
inflation. But, the concern for inflation makes the central bank increase the interest rate to
tame the increase in prices. The inflation starts to raise in the second quarter and reaches
a plateau at 0.44%, 3.25 years after fiscal consolidation commencement, and remains at that
level for the following 7 quarters, before it starts to fall.
The raising inflation requires (i) that government raises higher tax revenue to achieve its debt
target, and (ii) the central bank to raise nominal interest rates to stabilize prices. The peak
in the evolution of labor tax takes place 3.5 years after the fiscal consolidation commences
and reaches the value of 29.87% (29.17% in the benchmark case). The long-run tax rate is
reduced to 23.5% while in the benchmark case it is 23.8%. Higher labor tax rate and nominal
interest rate induce “crowding out” effects on household consumption and investment (as
the cost of capital rises). In turn, the employment (and output) losses are larger than in
the real benchmark model. The peak in the evolution of output losses occurs at 4.5 years
and it amounts to 1.7 percent deviations – 0.22% higher than in the benchmark case. The
unemployment reaches its trough earlier at 3.5 years and it is 2.2% (compared to 1.89% in
the benchmark case).
19The choice of φ = 58 is dictated by the fact that it yields the same inflation persistence as a Calvo price
setting model with an average duration of price contracts of 3 quarters.
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Figure 16: Fiscal Consolidation: Sticky Prices (I)
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Figure 17: Evolution of Output and Employment (II)
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These findings are confirmed by results in Table (11), which shows that the cumulative em-
ployment (and output) losses are larger than under the benchmark case. The discounted
output losses are 21.05% – 3.68% higher than in the benchmark case. Likewise, the employ-
ment losses are higher across all of the horizons. For example, at 5 years 31.75% – 3.89%
higher than in the benchmark case. The results indicate that the price stickiness does play a
Table 11: Cumulative losses: Sticky Prices
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.12 0.93 4.63 23.65 66.26 16.86 21.05
Employment 0.19 1.44 7.01 31.75 51.32 -9.07 –
role in the fiscal adjustment process, which comes at higher output and employment losses.
The interplay between of fiscal and monetary policy is relevant for the policy consideration
as there is a direct trade off between the fiscal consolidation and price stabilization.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis
The preceding results have shown that the interplay between fiscal and monetary policy can
hinder fiscal consolidation, and that the output and employment costs of reducing public debt
can be sizable in the short to medium run. This section assesses the robustness of the previous
findings to alternative settings for the consolidation policy. In particular, the sensitivity to
an alternative choice of fiscal instruments (namely, consumption tax), the degree of price
rigidity, and the different degree of monetary authority responsiveness to output and price
stabilization are investigated.
6.3.1 Consumption tax
The preceding section investigated the implications for employment and output of a reduction
in nominal debt accommodated by adjusting labor tax rate. In this section, fiscal consoli-
dation is obtaned through adjustments in the consumption tax instead. Figures 18 and 19
report the transitional path of employment, output and fiscal instruments obtained in this
case. As the predominant interest of this section is to explore the nominal aspect of fiscal
consolidation, we compare an economy with sticky prices (plain line) to an economy with flex-
ible prices (dashed line) when, in both cases, the fiscal adjustment is performed by changes
in the consumption tax rate. The right panel of Figure 18 shows, to achieve the same debt
transition path, government needs to follow the identical tax revenue path by adjusting its
consumption tax. The peak in the evolution of consumption tax rate, in the nominal econ-
omy, occurs at 3.5 years after the fiscal consolidation begins –same as in the real economy–
and it amounts to 9.98% –a marginally smaller adjustment than for a real economy, 10.3%.
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Figure 18: Fiscal Consolidation: Sticky Prices (I)
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Figure 18 indicates that employment (and output) losses are smaller in the nominal economy.
The employment losses reach its peak after 3.5 years and are 1.1% – compared to 1.28% in
the real economy. The output reaches its trough after 4.5 years and amount to 0.91% – this
is smaller than for a case of flexible prices, which is 1.01%.
Figure 19: Evolution of Output and Employment (II)
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These findings are further confirmed by the results shown in Table (12) where adjusting
the consumption tax produces than it was the case in real economy. For example, the
employment cumulative losses in two years are 4.16% – while we previously had it 4.45%, in
the real economy.
These results suggest that, when the consumption tax is an instrument of choice, the nominal
dimension of fiscal austerity cannot be ignored, but it is, nevertheless, less prominent than
for the labor tax. Thus, it is possible for a government to minimize the hindering effects of
monetary policy on its fiscal consolidation effort by adjusting consumption tax.
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Table 12: Cumulative losses: Consumption Tax Adjustment Under Sticky Prices
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output 0.08 0.60 2.77 13.29 35.32 5.67 9.50
Employment 0.13 0.92 4.16 17.75 26.56 -8.96 –
6.3.2 The degree of price rigidity
In this section we investigate how the degree of nominal rigidities affects the fiscal consolida-
tion. Figure 20 – 21 show the transitional paths of fiscal instruments, output and employment
as the degree of price rigidity, φ, varies in the range from 0 to 200 –the benchmark experi-
ment is set at φ = 58.20 From the right panel of Figure 20 we see that the major difference
in the labor tax, across different degrees of price rigidity, is in the first quarter. The larger
the degree of nominal sluggishness the larger the initial increase in the tax, as the inflation
tax cannot be used to generate more tax revenues. Once inflation adjusts further, the effect
of price rigidity on the response of labor tax vanishes. On one hand, for a very low price
rigidity, φ = 0, the initial response of labor tax is a fall from its steady state level – from 25%
to 24.6% – before it starts to increase. On the other hand, for a very high degrees of price
rigidities, φ = 200, the labor tax sharply increases from its steady state level – from 25% to
29.2% – but from the second quarter the labor tax adjustment is about the same as for other
cases. The peak responses in the evolution of labor tax occurs after 3.5 years following the
fiscal austerity and it is only slightly higher for flexible prices – 29.9% as opposed to 29.4%
for highly sticky prices.
Figure 20: Fiscal Consolidation: Sticky Prices (I)
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Figure 21 illustrates that, for flexible prices, φ = 0, the employment (and output) losses
20Note that the case φ = 0 does not exactly correspond to our benchmark economy as the benchmark
economy did not feature imperfect competition.
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are smaller in the first few quarters but consequently are more profound than for the sticky
prices. The results indicate that the employment and output are both falling in the degree
of price rigidity, but those deviations are smaller for a higher degrees of price rigidities.
Figure 21: Evolution of Output and Employment: Sticky Prices (II)
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As we have previously seen for a real economy, when prices are able to fully adjust, the
intertemporal substitution effect will push inflation up straight away in the first quarter
following the fiscal consolidation. The central bank then reacts to stabilize prices by increasing
the nominal interest rate. The consumption drops sharply in the first quarter and investment
at first increases in the attempt by households to smooth their future consumption. This
produces profound employment and output losses. Contrary, when prices are slow to adjust
the response of the households will be muted, thus, producing smaller employment and output
losses.
Table 13: Cumulative losses: Varying Price Stickiness
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
φ = 0 -0.12 0.27 3.50 22.45 65.21 15.78 20.00
φ = 58 0.24 1.33 5.22 21.27 50.79 0.31 8.64
φ = 200 0.22 1.27 4.84 17.93 32.99 -20.01 -6.10
Employment
φ = 0 -0.12 0.78 6.39 32.14 51.98 -8.38 –
φ = 58 0.36 1.97 7.62 29.40 45.92 -15.14 –
φ = 200 0.32 1.89 7.15 25.76 35.91 -26.07 –
These results are confirmed by the cumulative employment and output losses presented in
Table (13). For example, the discounted cumulative output losses are highest for flexible
prices and in fact turn into cumulative gains for very high degree of price rigidities – 20%
employment losses for φ = 0 versus 6.1% employment gains for φ = 200. After 5 years follow-
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ing the beginning of debt reduction, there is negative relationship between the employment
losses and the degree of price rigidity. For example, for fully flexible prices the employment
loss is about 32% but this is reduced down to about 26% for high degree of price rigidity,
φ = 200.
These results indicate that when prices are flexible the monetary policy is non neutral and
the central bank in its effort to stabilize prices can significantly hinder the fiscal consolidation
efforts.
6.3.3 The conduct of monetary policy
This section explores if the central bank, through its concern for inflation and output fluc-
tuations, affects the process of fiscal consolidation. Figure 22 shows the evolution of output
and employment as we vary the degree of reactiveness by central bank to inflation, κpi, and
output fluctuations, κy.
The degree of responsiveness to output fluctuations, κy, varies in the range from 0 to 0.25 –the
benchmark experiment is set at κy = 0.1. Naturally, greater emphasis on output stabilization
is expected to bring about smaller losses in output and employment. This is confirmed
by results shown in Panel (a) of Figure 22 where an increase in the reaction of monetary
authority to the output fluctuations leads to smaller output and employment losses. Under
this policy, the inflation increases and subsequently prompts the central bank to increase
nominal interest rate. Higher nominal interest rate makes the public debt more expensive
and instigates the households to decrease its debt holdings. Subsequently, this effect aids the
whole debt reduction. Consequently, the fiscal revenue required to retire the public debt will
not be as high as previously and, thus, the labor tax rate adjustment is lower. For example,
with κy = 0 the peak in the evolution of tax rate is 30.25% while with κy = 0.25 it is 29.4%
(after 3.5 years following the commencement of fiscal consolidation).
To explore the effect of price stabilization on the fiscal consolidation, the degree of respon-
siveness to output fluctuations, κpi, is varied in the range from 1.01 to 2.5 –the benchmark
experiment is set at κpi = 1.5– and to facilitate the exposition a policy rule with κy = 0 is
used. Naturally, reaction by central bank to subdue inflation by increasing nominal interest
rates will suppress the output and employment further. This is affirmed by Panel (b) of Fig-
ure 22 which depicts the evolution of employment and output as a function of the reaction
to inflation, κpi. An increased emphasis on price stability leads to higher output and employ-
ment losses. This points to the existence of another trade off between price stabilization and
fiscal consolidation effort.
The cumulative output losses as presented in Table (14) similarly point out that greater
emphasis on the output stabilization leads to lower output and employment losses in the
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Figure 22: Evolution of Output and Employment: Varying κpi and κy
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(b) Reaction to Inflation (κpi)
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short– and medium–run. For example, for the higher reactiveness by central bank to output
fluctuations, κy = 0.25, after 1 years following the beginning of fiscal consolidation we have
0.5% loss in output –0.93% in the benchmark experiment – and 0.8% in employment – 1.44%
in the benchmark experiment.
Table 14: Cumulative losses: Varying Response to Output
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
κy = 0 0.22 1.30 5.62 26.50 72.31 22.91 26.15
κy = 0.1 0.12 0.93 4.63 23.65 66.26 16.86 21.05
κy = 0.25 0.01 0.50 3.45 20.19 58.91 9.60 14.90
Employment
κy = 0 0.34 1.99 8.40 35.21 55.98 -4.70 –
κy = 0.1 0.19 1.44 7.01 31.75 51.32 -9.07 –
κy = 0.25 0.02 0.80 5.33 27.52 45.58 -14.35 –
Table 15: Cumulative losses: Varying Response to Inflation
Horizon 1 quarter 1 Year 2 Years 5 Years 20 Years 50 Years Discounted
Output
κpi = 1.01 0.09 0.83 4.39 23.05 64.74 15.22 19.76
κpi = 1.5 0.22 1.30 5.62 26.50 72.31 22.91 26.15
κpi = 2.5 0.19 1.20 5.35 25.75 70.50 20.83 24.55
Employment
κpi = 1.01 0.15 1.30 6.67 31.02 50.01 -10.35 –
κpi = 1.5 0.34 1.99 8.40 35.21 55.98 -4.70 –
κpi = 2.5 0.30 1.83 8.02 34.29 54.44 -6.36 –
The results indicate that the interplay between fiscal and monetary policies is non neutral.
One one hand, the central bank’s effort to stabilize the output fluctuations can ease the reces-
sion brought by fiscal consolidation but it prolongs the whole process of the debt reduction.
On the other hand, the price stabilization efforts hinder the public debt reduction process
and, thus, leads to greater output and employment losses.
7 Conclusion
This paper offers a quantitative evaluation of employment (and output) losses generated dur-
ing fiscal consolidation episodes. It does this in the context of a textbook neoclassical growth
model featuring —search and matching a´ la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Shimer
and Rogerson (2010)— frictions on the labor market. Sovereign debt reduction is achieved
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by imposing fiscal authority, either by tax hikes or government expenditures cuts, which
plunges the economy in a persistent recession and therefore generates output and employ-
ment losses.In the baseline experiment —a targeted 25% debt reduction— unemployment
increases by about 50%, starting from 5.5% and reaching 7.3% after 3.35 years. These em-
ployment losses are persistent and last on average 12 years. Furthermore, at the trough of
the recession (4.5 years following the beginning of the adjustment), output is 1.5% below its
initial steady state.
These losses are found to be especially acute during times of recession as there are competing
goals placed on the labor tax adjustment by (i) fiscal consolidation and (ii) output stabiliza-
tion. The sensitivity analysis indicates further that sizable and speedier debt adjustments
are associated with bigger employment and output losses. The front–loading of debt reduc-
tion brings bigger initial adjustment which magnifies the employment loss in the short–run.
However, economy recovers quicker compared to gradualist approach. A slower adjustment
allows for smooth debt adjustment that limits the initial employment loss, but in that case
it lasts longer and the economy, thus, suffers longer. Likewise, the more determined fiscal
authority is to front–load its debt, the bigger are employment and output losses, but the
painful adjustment period is shorter. These findings point to the existence of an intertem-
poral trade–off between short–run losses from fiscal consolidation and long–run gains from
reduced debt.
Moreover, the paper shows that, as already found in the econometric literature (see e.g.
Alesina et al. (2014)), the exact details of the consolidation plan do matter; government
spending cut versus tax hikes, the type of tax instrument used to achieve fiscal adjustment,
and the timing of the plan. Finally, monetary policy interplays with fiscal policy. The central
bank, by adjusting the nominal interest rate, affects the value of debt used by households to
transfer wealth from one period to the next. Higher nominal interest rate increases the value
of debt, which then reduces its demand by households. This aids the whole debt reduction
process and, thus, speeding up the fiscal consolidation in the short–run.
The results of this paper suggest that debt reduction should be accompanied with reforms
on the labor market to tame down labor market frictions. This is left for future research.
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—APPENDIX—
A Model
A.1 Household
The household has preferences over consumption and leisure described by the following in-
tertemporal utility function
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log ct − ϑ n
1+ν
t
1 + ν
)
(31)
subject to the budget constraint, the law motion of capital and the law motion of employment,
respectively,
(1 + τ ct )ct + it + bt =rt−1bt−1 + (1− τwt )wtnt + (1− τkt )ztkt + Πt + Tt (32)
kt+1 =
(
1− ϕ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2)
it + (1− δ)kt (33)
The optimality conditions are given as
λt =
1
ct(1 + τ ct )
(34)
λt = βλt+1rt (35)
ζt = β
(
λt+1(1− τkt+1)zt+1 + ζt+1(1− δ)
)
(36)
λt = ζt
(
1− ϕ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
− ϕ
(
it
it−1
− 1
)
it
it−1
)
+ βζt+1ϕ
(
it+1
it
− 1
)(
it+1
it
)2
(37)
where λt and ζt are the Lagrange multipliers associated, respectively, to the budget constraint
and the capital equation. This system rewrites as The household’s optimal behavior is then
characterized by the set of Euler conditions
1
ct(1 + τ ct )
= β
rt
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(38)
qit = β
ct(1 + τ
c
t )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(zt+1(1− τkt+1) + qit+1(1− δ)) (39)
where qit = ζt/λt denotes the marginal Tobin’s Q.
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A.2 Firm
The firm decides its production and vacancy posting plans by maximizing its intertemporal
discounted profit subject to the law of motion of employment
max
∞∑
t=0
Ψt,0
(
Atk
α
t (j)nt(j)
1−α − ztkt(j)− wtnt(j)− avt(j)
)
(40)
subject to
nt+1(j) = qtvt(j) + (1− ψ)nt (41)
Ψt,0 denotes the discount factor of the firm between periods 0 and t, given that, in the
model, the interests of the manager of the firm are aligned with those of the shareholder –the
household– the proper discount factor is given by Ψt,0 ∝ βt(1 + τ c0)∂U(ct,nt)∂ct /(1 + τ ct )
∂U(c0,n0)
∂c0
.
The optimality conditions are then given as
µt(j) = Ψt+1,t
{
(1− α) yt+1(j)
nt+1(j)
− wt+1 + (1− ψ)µt+1(j)
}
(42)
a = qtµt(j) (43)
zt = α
yt(j)
kt(j)
(44)
where µt(j) denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated to the law of motion of employment.
The optimal production and vacancy posting plans are characterized by the following opti-
mality conditions
zt = α
yt(j)
kt(j)
(45)
a
qt
= β
ct(1 + τ
c
t )
ct+1(1 + τ ct+1)
(
(1− α) yt+1(j)
nt+1(j)
− wt+1 + (1− ψ) a
qt+1
)
(46)
The first condition is the standard demand for capital. The second condition determines the
optimal vacancy posting behavior–and hence the optimal employment level.
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B Additional Figures
B.1 Real Model
Figure 23: Macroeconomic responses (Anticipated Debt Reduction Experiment)
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B.2 Sticky Price Model
Figure 24: Macroeconomic responses (Sticky Prices Experiment)
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Figure 25: Macroeconomic responses: Adjusting Consumption Tax Rate
(a) Good Market
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Figure 26: Macroeconomic responses: Varying the degree of price rigidity
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Figure 27: Fiscal Consolidation: Reaction to Output Gap
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Figure 28: Macroeconomic responses: Reaction to Output Gap
(a) Good Market
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Figure 29: Fiscal Consolidation: Reaction to Inflation
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Figure 30: Macroeconomic responses: Reaction to Inflation
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